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in addition to the role of the external environment, a common notion of 
political community or demos is necessary for democratisation to proceed 
and not to produce ethnic conflict. Drawing on John Burton’s human 
needs theory, she also argues that the impact of democratisation depends 
on whether the conflict is interest-based or needs-based, with the devel-
opment of democracy unlikely to resolve the latter. Given that her study 
is based on only two case studies, these are some fairly bold generalised 
conclusions. That said, Engström makes clear that the case studies are 
intended to act as theory-generating devices (p. 137) and one presumes, 
although she does not explicitly state this, that her intention is that these 
conclusions be tested on further cases. In this vein, her book could use-
fully be recommended to postgraduate or advanced undergraduate stu-
dents planning research projects.
In addition to her theoretical contribution, Engström’s investigation 
of the Bulgarian and Macedonian cases is valuable in itself, providing 
a welcome insight into these under-studied cases. With many scholars 
opting to research cases characterised by the outbreak of violent conflict, 
it is refreshing to read about instances where the ending is happier, even 
if the good story comes with caveats. Engström’s study makes an impor-
tant theoretical contribution to the literature and advances our under-
standing of the Bulgarian and Macedonian cases. As such, it is highly 
recommended.
LAURENCE COOLEY
Laurence Cooley is a PhD student in the Department of Political Science 
and International Studies at the University of Birmingham, UK.
Michael J. Williams, NATO, Security and Risk Management: From 
Kosovo to Kandahar (London and New York: Routledge, 2009, 160 pp., 
$140.00 hbk).
Applying risk-society ideas to the business of war and security is an 
 obvious thing to do – if ‘world risk society’ is one in which manufactured 
risks and the management of possible futures become central to politics, 
then this has obvious implications for the politics of war and security. In 
this volume, the author builds convincingly on a growing body of risk-
security literature to produce a recent history of NATO that explains and 
comments on the organisation’s difficulties and changes since the end of 
the Cold War. 
The problem faced by NATO in the 1990s was not only that its main 
enemy had crumbled, but also that a wholly different way of thinking 
about security was emerging – one that did not chime well with the tra-
ditional military alliance structure and rule book with which NATO had 
remained encumbered. From Kosovo to Afghanistan and Iraq, NATO 
set about not so much dealing with a direct or immanent threat from a 
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foe with a stable geographical base, as managing amorphous risks in a 
fluid and nebulous environment. In Kosovo, there was vague unease at 
the potential for future ‘instability’ in Europe. NATO members had dif-
fering interpretations of this, and varying risk cultures led to damaging 
disagreement on policy and tactics. After 9/11, the Taleban regime in 
Afghanistan posed no conventional military threat but represented a risk, 
having harboured the mentors of the perpetrators of the World Trade 
Center attacks. Again, risk management is NATO’s aim but widely dif-
fering perceptions and strategies continue to hamper its major defining 
mission in Afghanistan. In Iraq, the author argues that war was based on 
a precautionary principle of proactively preventing the threat of weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD) being developed by a hostile regime. From 
a traditional realist perspective, the attack on an effectively contained 
Saddam Hussein always looked rash and unnecessary. From a risk per-
spective, it made sense, the author argues: there could have been a threat 
from the Iraqi regime and although time has shown that the threat was 
effectively contained, the uncertainty was real at the time. But, as a defen-
sive pact, NATO was not geared to acting proactively and out of area on 
the basis of risk and uncertainty, which was consistently interpreted in 
widely differing ways by NATO members. In Kosovo, it was impossible 
to agree on common terms of engagement. In Iraq, NATO was split on 
whether to engage at all. Williams concludes that, given the arrival of the 
risk paradigm, NATO is in terminal decline unless new norms and rules 
for action geared towards flexible risk management can be agreed upon.
This book works well both as an introduction to risk security and as a 
study of NATO and recent trouble in the transatlantic relationship. While 
it does not claim to develop an IR theory of security as such (p. 7), it is 
an impressively systematic application of the risk-society concepts to a 
major security actor. In fact, the newly appointed secretary-general of 
NATO would do well to read it. Williams makes very clear the major 
challenges NATO faces: managing hazy clusters of risks in faraway loca-
tions, involving a set of actors with differing cultures and risk perceptions 
locked into an organisation designed for another era. The boomerang 
effect – when risk management efforts generate new risks, like the ter-
rorism and chaos in Iraq after Saddam – is also an important problem for 
NATO that risk theory highlights admirably. 
If there is one weakness, the book could have reflected more critically 
on the intellectual basis on which it relies. For instance, how much does 
‘old-fashioned’ threat-deterrence logic actually persist, for example in 
arguments put forward for the maintenance of nuclear arsenals? Why, if 
security is now thought of in terms of risks not threats, was Iraq presented 
to the world as an imminent and impending threat to the West? It seems 
that, rather than replacing the idea of threats, risks have joined the fray in 
the security field.
Secondly, there is a risk that risk discourse emanating from politi-
cal actors is taken at face value by risk theorists. Risk discourse could 
instead be seen as self-justification rather than historical explanation. 
For Williams, ‘(t)he logic of the war against Iraq in 2003 is only difficult 
to understand if one uses an outdated framework for analysis’ (p. 101). 
Citing President Bush’s rhetoric as evidence of the risk paradigm, he 
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argues that ‘the scenario of what could happen becomes the impetus for 
action in the present’ (p. 103). This assumes that the public legitimation 
of war put forward by Bush and the ‘impetus for action’ are roughly the 
same. What if Iraq was about oil, not the constructed risk of WMD?
More generally, there is a potential problem concerning the level and 
ambition of explanation. Explaining specific policies as the result of a 
general sociological shift into ‘risk society’ involves a jump from meta-
 societal discourse to policy level that inevitably relies on intermediate 
factors affecting foreign policy. The author is therefore right to say that 
the risk-security perspective is not a theory of international relations in 
itself. But in terms of getting a handle on what states are making of anar-
chy at the moment and how military action is justified, it is a powerful set 
of ideas fully deserving of more attention.
T. O. CORRY
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Laura Neack, Elusive Security: States First, People Last (New York:  Rowman 
and Littlefields, 2007, 263 pp., $24.95 pbk).
According to Barry Buzan (‘Peace, Power, and Security: Contending 
Concepts in the Study of International Relations’, Journal of Peace Research 
21, no. 2 [1984]: 124), security has been viewed as a synthesis of two 
old concepts, power and peace, in the study of international relations. 
Compared to either concept, security is a more comprehensive term that 
can embrace both ideas, creating a common ground for the understanding 
of problems in international relations (ibid., 109). However, despite the 
remarkable contribution it could make in the ongoing debates, security 
remains a contested concept due to the fact that its scope can be widened 
and the referents can be deepened. In this sense, security encapsulates 
an inherent tension between explaining everything and nothing. Also, 
as Neack frequently describes, security has a highly elusive nature: the 
concept remains dominated by state-centric theorising (national security 
being the primary level of analysis in the international system) even as 
human security gains greater legitimacy (p. 1).
With a comprehensive illustration of security at the national, inter-
national and human levels throughout the chapters, the author skilfully 
debates the problem of national-centric security coexisting with inter-
national or human security concerns. The state remains the ‘first’ actor in 
the system, and the international system and human beings are relegated 
to serve the interests of the state. Drawing on peacekeeping operations 
undertaken in the 1990s, Neack demonstrates how the United Nations 
protects the security of the great power states at the expense of lesser 
states. In addition, the idea of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) fails 
to promote the state and international responsibility to protect people 
 at CAMBRIDGE UNIV LIBRARY on August 10, 2016mil.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
